And if it is so that Rabbi Akiva lists the different shades in decreasing order of their degree of brightness, then after mentioning the reddish variation of baheret he should have next said: The reddish variation of a wool-white mark is darker than it, not that the reddish variation of lime is darker than it.

They said in response to this: Yes, it is indeed so that Rabbi Akiva continues by referring to the reddish variations of a wool-white mark, and it is taught likewise in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says, referring to that mishna: It is not correct that Rabbi Akiva said: The reddish variation of lime is darker than it; rather, he said that the reddish variation of a wool-white mark is darker than it.

§ The Gemara considers the source from which the different shades of marks are derived: And from where do we derive that baheret is an intense white color? Abaye said: The verse states: ''And if it is a white baheret'' (Leviticus 13:4), which indicates that it alone is a bright white and there is no other as white as it.

The Sages taught in a baraita: The bright shade of a baheret makes it appear deeper than the surrounding skin, and so the verse states: ''And its appearance is deeper than the skin'' (Leviticus 13:25). This is like the appearance of an area illuminated by the sun, which appears deeper than the area in the shade. The darker shade of a se’et makes it appear as though it is raised above the surrounding skin; this is indicated by the fact that the word se’et means nothing other than raised, and so the verse states: ''Upon all the high mountains and upon all the raised up [hanissaot] hills'' (Isaiah 2:14). The words hanissaot and se’et share the same Hebrew root and both refer to something raised up. In the verse: ''For a se’et and for a sappaḥat'' (Leviticus 14:56), the word sappaḥat means nothing other than secondary, and so the verse states: ''And he will say: Append me [sefaḥeni] please to one of the priestly classes to eat a piece of bread'' (I Samuel 2:36). This teaches that there is a leprous mark that is secondary and appended to a se’et. This is a mark that is the color of an egg membrane.

We found a source for a mark that is secondary to a se’et; from where do we derive that there is also a mark that is secondary to a baheret? Rabbi Zeira said: ''White'' (Leviticus 13:10) is stated with regard to a se’et and ''white'' (Leviticus 13:4) is stated with regard to a baheret. This teaches that just as the shade of white stated with regard to a se’et has a secondary mark, i.e., the mark that is the color of an egg membrane, so too, the shade of white stated with regard to a baheret has a secondary mark, i.e., the lime-colored mark.

A different source for this was taught in a baraita: The verse (see Leviticus 13:2) placed the word sappaḥat between se’et and baheret, to say to you: Just as there is a shade that is secondary to a se’et, so too, there is a shade that is secondary to a baheret.

The mishna in Nega’im cited above states: A se’et is like white wool. The Gemara asks: What is meant by white wool? Rav Beivai says that Rav Asi says: It is the color of clean wool from a lamb that is wrapped up [mekhabnin] in a cover when it is one day old in order to protect it from being sullied, so that the wool will be suitable for producing a fine wool garment.

§ In continuation of his statement cited above Rabbi Ḥanina says: The following is an analogy to illustrate the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., the opinion expressed in the mishna in Nega’im (1:1) that both a baheret and a se’et have marks that are secondary to them. To what is this matter comparable? To two kings and to two governors [iparkhei] where, with regard to their supremacy, the king of this governor is above the king of that governor, and the governor of this king is above the governor of that king. The two kings are analogous to a baheret and a se’et and their two governors are, respectively, a lime-colored mark and an egg membrane–colored mark. Accordingly, the order of supremacy is: Baheret, se’et, lime-colored mark, egg membrane–colored mark.

The Gemara questions whether this is a suitable analogy for the opinion of the Rabbis: But this analogy suggests that the shades are ordered, this one above this one and that one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness. That is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, not the opinion of the Rabbis.

Rather, a suitable analogy is where the king of this governor is above his own governor, and the king of that governor is above his own governor. So too, each secondary mark is subordinate only to its primary mark.

The Gemara presents a different analogy. Rav Adda bar Abba said: For example: A king, and a chief officer [alkafta], the vizier [rofila], and the Exilarch; each person in the list is more powerful than the subsequent one. The Gemara asks: But this analogy suggests that the shades are ordered, this one above that one, which is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. Rather, a suitable analogy is, for example: A king and the vizier; and a chief officer and the Exilarch. This list splits the four into two groups, each group containing one person who is subordinate to the other.

The Gemara presents a different analogy. Rava said: The previous suggestion is not precise because all these positions, apart from the king, are subordinate to the king. A more precise analogy would be, for example: King Shapur, the king of Persia, with his subordinate; and the Roman emperor with his subordinate.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Which of them is greater, King Shapur or the Roman emperor? Rava said to him: Does he eat in the forest, i.e., do you live disconnected and unaware of events in the world at large? Go out and see whose coin circulates throughout the world, which is an indicator of a government’s influence, as it is written with regard to the fourth empire described in Daniel’s dream of the future powers of the world: ''It shall devour the whole earth and tread upon it and break it into pieces'' (Daniel 7:23), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the guilty empire of Rome whose coin circulates throughout the entire world.

The Gemara presents a different analogy. Ravina said: For example, a new white woolen garment and a frayed one; a new linen sheet and a frayed one.

§ The mishna (2a) states: In cases of defiling the Temple or its sacrificial foods in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between while he actually transgressed, this person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the verse that describes the liability for a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2–4) speaks of nothing other than the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods? While the verse mentions that a violation was committed due to a lapse of awareness of one’s state of impurity, it does not mention which transgression was violated.

The Gemara explains: And it is a logical inference: Since the Torah has explicitly prohibited and also prescribed punishment for the intentional defiling of something sacred and has rendered one liable to bring an offering for the unwitting defiling of something sacred, it follows that just as when it prohibited and also prescribed punishment for the defiling of something sacred it prohibited and also prescribed punishment only for the intentional defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods; so too, when it rendered one liable to bring an offering for the defiling of something sacred it rendered one liable to do so only for the unwitting defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

The Gemara asks: But say instead that the obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering is referring to a ritually impure person who partook of the sacred portion of produce grown in Eretz Yisrael that is designated to be given to a priest [teruma], as the Torah also has explicitly prohibited and prescribed punishment for this. One who partakes of teruma while ritually impure is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven (see Leviticus 22:9). The Gemara answers: It cannot be referring to teruma, because we do not find a sin whose punishment for an intentional violation is death, with regard to which one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation. Sin-offerings, of which the sliding-scale offering is one type, are brought only for transgressions whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The Gemara asks: But say that this statement applies only to a fixed sin-offering, but